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CONSTRUCTION OF "SURVIVAL ACT" "AND "DEATH
'"ACT" IN MICHIGAN."
r Ec'TION 10,17 of-3 -Miller's Compiled Laws reads as follows:
'-"In addition to the actions which survive by the common
law, the fol lowing shall also sfurvive; that is to say, •actions
of replevin, and trover, actions of assault and battery, false
imprisonment, for'goods taken and carried away, f6r negli-
gent injury to persons, for damage (lone to real and pers6nal
estate, and 'actions to recover real estate where persons have
'been induced' to part with the sirne through fraudulefit -ep-
resentations and deceit."
I.It is known as the "Survival Act" and has been in force..-since
1838, with the exception of the pqrt relating to.actions to.recover
real estate and the words, "for negligent injurie to persons." The
latter. were inserted in 1885. .-
Section 10,427 reads as follows:
"Whenever- the death of a person "shall be caused by
wrongful.act, neglect-or default, and the act, neglect or de-
fault is such as would (if 'death had not ensued) have entitled
the party injured to maintain'an action, and recover darhages,
in respect thereof, then and in every such case, the- person
who, or the corporation which would have been liable, if
death had not-ensued, shall be liable to an action for dam-
ages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and
although the death shall have been caused under such -cir-
cum.tances ag amount in la-* to felony."
, It is known as the "Death Act." It was. enaced in i848,'amended
in 1873, and follows closely Lord Campbell's Act.
In the, construction of these acts, troublesome questions have
arisen, difficulties have been encountered, different theories urged,
different views entertained, different conclusions .reached, and differ-
ent opinions rendered, respecting the number of actions that can
be maintained under their, the circumstances that invoke -one rather
than'the other, the measure of damages applicable, respectively, and
certain questions of practice as to the joinder of .counts and the
amendment of pleadings. The statement would- hardly he justified
,that all these questions havre finally been settled in this state; some
of them undoubtedly areclosed; others perhaps remain, open.. The
cases are numerous, but the limits of this article allow reference to
a few of them only.
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Among the cases as to the number of actions that can be main-
tained, that of Sweetland v. Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Co.,1
and that of Dolson v. Lake' Shore & Michigan Southern Railway
Co.2 are leading ones. In the Sweetland case the declaration con-
tained a couti upon the Survival Act and'one upon the Death Act.
In the-court below plaintiff recovered upon the former and the de-
fendant upon the iatter, and a writ of error was taken. Four opin-
ions were rendered in the Supreme Court. Three .of the judges
were of the opinion that these acts did not give two rights-of action
for the same injury resulting in death. One of them was of the
opinion that they contemplated two separate and distinct remedies,
both of whicli might, under proper cirtumstances, be enforced; and
one of them was of the opinion .that under the record it was not
necessary to pass upon this question.
In support of the' view that these acts did not provide a double
remedy where death resulted from the wrongful act, it was said
in substance: That inasmuch as, until the amendment of iS8 5 of
the Survival Act, no suit could be maintained in this state after the
death of the injured person for the pain and suffering arising from
negligent injuries, it was not the intention of the'legislature, under
that act, to give a right of action for the benefit of the estate in
case of death from an injury, and also to allow the heirs to recover
under the Death Act for their' pecuniary- loss; that the fact that
the Survival Act was for the benefit of the decedent's estate and the
Death Act for the benefit of the decederit's heirs could make no
difference in the construction placed upon these acts; that it was not
the intentibii of the legislature to provide a double remedy; that the
Death Act was passed subsequent to the Survival Act and was. in-
tended to give the only remedy where death resulted from the
wrongful act; that, inasmuch as it was generally held that judg-
ment recovered or settlement made by the injured party in his life-
time was a bar to recovery by the heirs under the! Death Act, it
-followed that a judgment-by the heirs under the Survival Act would
bar the right to recover 'unde"r the Death Act; that it had "not been
- the understanding of courts and laWx-"writers that such statutes were
intended to create two rights of action for the same wrongful act;
that whild repeafs, by implication were not favored, there was no
such repugnance here that both 'acts could' not stand; that it was
plain from'the terms of the statutes that the Survival Act applied
to :cases where death'restiltsg from other causes than fhe wrongful
injury; that in other jurisdictions iimilar statutes were held not to
1 Sweetland v. Chicago & Grand Trunk-Railway Co., x ' Mich. 329.
2 Dolsoi v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co., 'zr8 Mich. 4.
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give a dual remedy; that as far -as it could be ascertained, it had
never before been claimed in this state that a cause of action sur-
vived for a negligent injury or -for an assault and battery where
death results from the wrongful act, notwithstanding both acts had
been on the statute books for more than fifty years and the. amend-'
ment for negligent injuries for over twelve years; that the profes-
sion in this state understood that two actions would not lie for the
same wrongful act; that the legislative intent in passing the. amend-
ment of i885 was apparent from the history of the cases ini this
state; that prior to i885, if the party negligently injured brought
suit for damages, and died during its, pendency from some cause
other than the negligent injury, the suit immediately abated, and
no right -of action accrued under the Death Act, and this because
death was not the result of the wrongful act or omission; that'since
the Death Act was enacted actions could be maintained under it,
when death resulted from -the wrongful act, and therefore it was
not necessary to provide by amendment for a right of action where
death resulted from the wrongful. act as that right already existed;
that -the purpose of the amendment of the Survival Act in i885
was to provide a remidy when one was lost by the death of the,
party; that the only' logical construction was that the Death Act"
applied .to cases of death caused by wrongful injuries and the Sur-
vival Act to cases where the injury did not cause death; that had
both acts been enacted at; the same time, in different sections of the
same act there would have been no room for -the contention that the
Survival Act applied to injuries resulting in death, that in that
case, -as now, both sections would have to be reconciled and the leg-
'islative intent of the Survival' provision mn reference to injuries
causing death would still have been' open and the illogical result of
holding that 'the Survival provision was intended to cover cases
of wrongful killing would have forced the conclusion that the legis-
lature intended the Survival provision should apply only to personal
injuries not causing death; that the result would not be changed if
we started with the Survival Act as in existence when the Death
Act was passed, as we should then have an, act which provided for
-the survival of actions for personal injuries, followed by another
giving a right of action for personal injuries resulting in death, and
that it could -ikt_b cntended that the Survival Act conferred'a
right of action for wrongful killing, as more definite and specific
language indicative of the legislative purpose would-be necessary;
that the only logical construction 'and that.given by. most of the
cases was that the Survival Act applies to cases of negligent in-
juries to the person that are not fatal, and the Death Act applies
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to fatal cases; that, if rights of action existed'under both statutes
when death was not instantaneous *there would seem no good rea-
-son for, holding that recovery of judgment by the irijured party
should be a bar to an -action under the Death Act for his subsequent
death, as recovery in such case is permitted, not upon the injury
sustained by the deceased, but -upon the pecuniary it-jury to the sur-
vivors occasioned by his death, yet courts generally, and- in accord-
ance with the legislative intention, so hold; that, had the intention
been otherwise, the act would probably have permitted each sur-
vivor to bring and prosecute his own action for his own berfefit, in-
stead of requiring it to be brought by- the personal representative
and providing for a distribution. I
In favor of the view that these., acts contemplated, under proper
circumstances, a double remedy- it was said -in substance: That the
history of the legislation and the legislative intent gathered there-
-from favored it; that as early as 1882 it had been held that the
Suirvival-Act was intended to provide for the survival- of the cause
of action, otherwise there would be force-in the contention that it
was intended to apply to pending actions and to provide- for the re-
vival of the'action when commenced by the deceased in his life-
time; that when the amendment Qf 1885 was added to the Survival
Act the latter already' had a judicial- construction, and that-it was
fair to assume that the amendient was made in view of this con-
struction and that the legislative intent was to provide for the sur-
vival of the cause of action in the cases specified, the right to recover-
from injuries from negligence being placed, by the amendment, on
the same plane as the causes of action enumerated in the section
before the amendment; that-in the case of injuries causing death
a recovery for damages prior to the death of the injured party
could have been had before the enactment of the Death Act, and any
-other, conclusion would render the legislative intent absurd; that
repeals by 'implication were not favored; that it was -not the legis-
lative intent that the Death Act should be a subgtitute for the Sur-
vival Act-in all cases in .which death ensued, although there were
some considerations favoring the view that such was the intent,
namnely, that it should not be lightly inferred that two remedies
were given for the same evil, and that the Death Act was apparent-
ly-broad enough to cover all cases in which death results from the
wrongful act of another; that the remedies were distinct and differ-
ent; that the-right of the personal representative to recover under
-the Survival Act -for injuries sustained by his decedent during'his
life-time, notwithstanding his death, and the limitation upon recov-
ery under the Death Act to the pecuniary loss resuiting from St ch
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death, to the persons who may be entitled to such damages when
recovered, make it clear that the Death Act does not cover the whole
ground as, for instance, in those cases in which no pecuniary loss
can be shown resulting from the death no recovery, car he had un-
der the Death Act although the deceased would have been entitled
to substantial damages if he had taken action in his lifetime, and
notwithstanding the express provision of the Survival Act that his
cause of action shall survive; that the view that a settlement or
recovery by the injured party in his lifetime is. a bar to an action
by his personal representative is of equal force to show that the
remedy under the Death Act is not exclusive as it is to show that
the double remedy does not exist; that the terms of .the Death Act
itself show that such settlement or such recovery would be a bar,
for it is only where the injured party himself would,,had death not
ensued, been entitled to maintain an action, that the remedy is given
to the widow or next of kin, and of course, he would not so have
been entitled at the time of his death if he had already recovered or
settled for the injury; that the fact thaf under the Death Act no
recovery can be had for pain and suffering preceding death, nor
for any damages resulting to the injured party which pretedes,
death, nor at all, unless in addition to the injury and the resulting
death, a direct pecuniary loss is shown to have resulted to some one
or more of those who take of the estate of the injured party under
the statute of distribution, shows that this act does not continue
the right in all cases; that the previous decisions of this court fav-
ored i; -that it was supported by the decisioiis upon similar statutes
in other states as shown by a carefully .prepared series of articles.;
that in two of the states in which the existence of the double rem-
edy was denied, the reasoning of the courts did not answer those
given here, but on the contrary, in one of the leading cases sup-,
ported the conclusion in favor of the double remedy, and in another
of these states, the authority was weakened by the fact that a very
able judge who was a member of the court when the decision was
rendered had since, in another case, expressed doubts as to its cor-
rectness; that the difficulty in the construction of these statutes
had been aggravated by any attempt to depart from the letter of
the statutes themselves.
The practical result in the Sweetland case was a reversal of the
judgment of the court below upon the count based upon the Sur-
vival Act, two of the judges dissenting.-
In the Dolson case, the declaration contained two counts, one un-
der the Survival Act and one under the Death Act. In the court
below the plaintiff recovered on each count, and the defendant
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brought error. One of the principal questions submitted to the Su-
preme Court in this case was: Whether, if plaihtiff was, entitled
to recover at all, was he entitled to maintain an action under both
acts? The judges differed as to what had been decided in the
Sweetand case. Three of them were of the opinion that it decided
that two remiedies did not exist, while two of them were of the
opinion that it did not so decide and that the 4uestion was still
open. Four opinions were rendered in this case also. The Chief
Justice, who, in the Sweetland case, was of the opinion that recov--
cry could be had under both acts, stoutly adhered to his former con-
clusion; declared that upon that question his views not only re-
mained unchanged but had been fortified by a re-examination of
the cases;" that he did not understand that anyone contended that it
was incompetent for the legislature to give remedies to two parties
for the same wrongful act; that there was no declaration in either
of the statutes that two remedies did not exist; and that the judg-
ment of the-court below should be affirmed. The Justice who had
expressed no opinion on this question in the Sweetland case said
that "no legal question has been brought to my. attention recently
in which. there is more conflict in the decisions of the courts. The
opinions. are contradictory, and it w6uld be difficult to reconcile
them with each other," and after a review of authorities, reached
the conclusion that "the language of the two acts is not ambig-
uous. There is nothing, to my mind, in the language of the Death
Act which indicates that it was intended to repeal the Survival Act;
or in the language of either act which precludes a representative of
the estate of the deceased from recovering for the benefit of the
estate under the Survival Act, and for the benefit of the persons
entitled to the personal property of the deceased under the-Death
Act;" and he agreed with the Chief Justice that the judgment of
the court below should be affirmed. The other three Justices con-
curred in holding that a double remedy did not exist, and the judg-
ment of the court below as to the count upon the Death Act was
"reversed, and as to the recovery upon the count based on the Sur-
vival Act affirmed.
In the Carbary case3 it- is said, in reference to these two acts, in
an opinion from which no one dissented, and in respect to a declara-
tion containing a count under each, "it must be admitted that there
is not a double remedy, and that the existence of one cause of ac-
tion is entirely inconsistent with the existence of the other." The
question is therefore settled In this state. The Survival Act and the
Death Act do not give a double remedy for the same wrongful act.
2 Carbary v. Detroit Railway, x57 Mich. 683.
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What are the circumstances that -invoke one of- these acts rather
than the other? When must the plaintiff count upon the Survival
Act and.when upon the Death Act? Contradictory- answers have
been given by the different judges to these questions.- In -the
Sweetland case, two of the judges were of the opinion that the
Death Act applied in all cases where death results from a wrongful
act, and the Survival Act, when death results from other causes,
one of the judges favored a construction limiting the operation of
the Death Act to cases where death was instantaneous and allowing
the Survival Act to apply whenever a right of action accrued to
the person injured; and, as we have seen, one of 'the judges was of"
'the opinion that under proper circumstances, two remedies might.
be in force at the, same time for the same wrongful act. In the
Dolson case the judge, who, in the Sweetland case, had inclined to
the construction limiting the operation of the Death Act .to cases
where death was instantaneous, entered 'upon a re-examination of
the question' and reached the conclusion that where death was not
instantaneous, the administrator recovers "under the Survival Act,
and if death be instantaneous, he recovers, under the Death Act.
In this conclusion two of the other judges concurred, admitting;
however, that they had "expressed somewhat different views in the
Sweetland case" and saying they now concurred "that a rule might
be established for the guidance of the Circuit Courts and parties in
future cases." One of the judges who concurred in this View in the
Dolson case vigorously .dissented from it in the Sweetland case and
gave an illustration showing* that its practical application would
-lead to absurd results and that its adopti6n would be opposed. to a
-number of Michigan cases' which he cited, 'and closed his crificism
by saying: "If, therefore, the Death Act can be applied only'to
cases where the death was instantaneous, it ought to be amended in
order that the widow and children of the deceased may have, some
benefit from it." Another of the judges, referring to the view
adopted in the Dolson case, said that when it was suggested in the
Sweetland case "none of the oiher justices concurred." Notwith-
standing this difference of opinion later cases' show that the doc-
trine has been firmly established that "where the death is not in-
stantaneous, the administrator recovers under the .Survival Act,
'Van Brunt v. Railroad Co:, 78 Mich. 530; Hunn v. Railroad Co., 78 Mich. 513;
Sweet v. Railroad Co., 87 Mich. 559; Richmond v. Railroad Co., 87 Mich. 374,
Schlacker v. Mining Co., 89 Mich. 253; O'Donnell v. Railway' Co., 89 Mich. x74; Pen-
nington v. Railway Co., go Mich. 5o; Racho v. City of Detroit, go Mich. 92.
5 Jones v. McMilan, x29 Mich. 86; Kyes v. Valley Telephone Co., ;32 Mich. 281;
Storrie v. Grand Trunk Elevator Co., 134 Mich. 298.
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and that, where the- death is instantaneous, the. recovery, if any,
must be under the Death Act."
Another very interesting question has arisen in this -connection:
When is the death instantaneous within the meaning of the rule
that we have seen was finally adopted? Here -also different views
have been expressed. In Speaking of the count upon the Survival
Act in the Sweetland case, one of the judges says: "The rule de-
ducible. from the above authorities and'we "think also from -sound
reason is, that plaintiff must show that there -was conscious suffer-
ing in order t6 sustain his suit for damages. It is not sufficient to
show -that the deceased might have lived a *few moments after the-
action.". Two other judges seemed to have concurred in this stite-
ment.. It is probable,, however, that this statement was made with
reference: only to the right to recover damages for pain and suffer-
ing and not intended as a necessary test to recovery under the Sur-
vival Act.. In the same case another judge said: "Manifestly, had
death not been immediate, an action would have accrued, which
might have been maintained and recovery had by the deceased, if
he should live long enough; and if not, then by his representative,
under the Survival Act then existing, But on- the other hand; if
death was instantaneous, a right of action- could not -accrue to him,
though it would have done so, as we have already seen, had he
lived long enough to suffer pain or injury of any kind." In the
Dolson case, two of the justices say: "If the injury had occasioned
immediate death, no one questions but that the action must have
been brought under the Death Act, and no other action would lie."
In another case;P where the injured party lived for three days and
the action was based upon the Death Act, the Supreme Court, in
reversing the case upon other grounds, says: "From the undis-
puted facts, it is apparent that the ruile laid down in the 'Dolson
case' was not followed. A right of action existed in favor of the
deceased, which survived, if any right of action existed; and the
statute does not give a right of action for causing this death. The
case was, theref6re, tried upon a wrong theory. The mistake ap-
pears to have been mutual, and it was, perhaps, a natural one, in
view of the uncertainty then existing upon the rule that would ulti-"
mately be laid down by this court."
In the Olizier Case,7. "plaintiff's intestate was injured, while rid-
ing in a wagon, through a collision with a street car. He was ren-
dered unconscious, in which condition he remained until his death
upon the succeeding day." The declaration contained counts under
'Jones v. McMillan, z29 Mich. 86.
'Olivier v. Houghton County Street-Railway Co., 134 Mich. 367.
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"both the Survival Act and the Death Act. It was undisputed upon
the trial that the deceased lived until the day following his injury.
The court below, therefore, excluded all testimony on the *counts
based on the'Death Act. Plaintiff, obtaining verdict and judgment
for only four dollars, brought error and raised the question whether-
he was entitled to recover under the Death Act. In an opinion in
which all .the judges concurred, it is said:.
"We see no reason for splitting hairs as to what is meant
by instantaneous death, though we can appreciate .the differ-
ence between a continuing irijury resulting in drowning, or
death by hanging, throwing from a housetop, etc., and one
.where a person survives the wrongful act in an injured con-
dition.- There is no occasion for saying that one dies in-
stantly because such. survival is accompanied by a, comatose
condition," or unconsciousness, or insanity, or idiocy. The
law draws no such distinction between the normal and ab-
normal, or the rational and irrational. Either has a right of
action. In some cases the intervention of a next friend is
necessary, bvst that makes no difference. -See 8 Am, & Eng.
Enc, Law (2d Ed.), 866; and see, also, Keilow v. Railway
Co., 68 Iowa, 47o (23 N. W. 740, 27 N. W. 466, 56 Am.
Rep. 858), Where it-was held that survival of the.injiiry for
a moment is sufficient to permit the cause of action to vest
and survive. * * *"
The rule laid down in this case seems to be definite and certain
and one that could be easily applied. We are not so sure, however,
of this in the light of another case5 decided December 3oth, x9og.
The facts were as follows: Decedent was struck by a street car.
"He was carried under the car and crushed, so that when taken out,
-life was extinct. He was heard to groan for about fifteen minutes
after the accident." The plaintiff counted upon the Death Act, and
obtained a verdict. 'Defendant brought error and, as one ground,
urged that plaintiff had selected the wrong remedy. In passing
upon the question, the court said:
"The action is planted upon the so-called Death' Act, and
defendant contends that, as. under the undisputed testimony,
plaintiff's deceased continued to live for some fifteen min-
utes after he was struck, though he was dead when, taken
from beneath the car, the appropriate remedy is under the
Survival Act, citing the case of Oliier v. St. Ry. Co., 134
Mich. 367. We are of the opinion that this case is distinct
S West, admrx., v. Detroit United Railway, 159 Mich. 269.-
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authority for the opposite view. Where there is a continu-
ing injury, resulting in death within a few moments, it is in-
stantaneous within the meaning of.the statute."
In a still later case-5 (July 14th, I9IO,) -the declairation contained
a count upon the Survival Act and one upon the Death Act. The
deceased survived the original injury from ten minutes to perhaps
half an hour. The court below was of the opinion that plaintiff had
no cause of action under the Survival Act. Error was assigned
and the Supreme Court in reversing the case, said:
"We are of the opinion that it cannot be said as a matter
of law, upon this record, that the Survival Act did not apply.
This case does not fall within, the principle of the case of
West v. D. U. R., i59 Mich. 269. In that case the direct
cause of death continued to operate directly upon the in-
jured person until life was extinct. In the present case the
direct cause of death did not operate continuously but ceased
with the first blow, and plaintiff survived the original in-
jury from ten minutes to perhaps a half hour. In our opin-
ion the facts disclosed by this record bring the case. within
,the principle of. Olivier y. St. Ry. Co., 134 Mich. 367."
Can it be said that these cases furnish a definite and certain' test
as to the applicability of these statutes under all circurhstances?
We have seen thaf it has been settled that an action cannot be main-
tained under both acts for the same injury; that the Death Act ap-
plies in all cases where the death is instantaneous; but just- when;-
within the meaning of the rule, death is instantaneous, appears to
be left in doubt.
In the Sweetland case it is said:- "There is one view of the law-
tht might reconcile these two acts without doing violence to either;
and give a certain and definite rule. It is, that where the person is
injured, and lives after the transaction, a right of action accrues to
him, which survives in case of his death before judgment, and that
in such case the Death Act has no application. But, if the person is
killed outright, no right of action could accrue to him, therefore
none could survive, and consequently the Death Act could furnish
the only relief."
In the Dolson case, in speaking-of the Death Act, it is said: "We
find then, that, where death p"evented an action from accruing to
the deceased, this act gave a remedy, and in no other case; in other
words, where the action was not, prevented from accruing, it did
not give a remedy. This section plainly proceeds upon the theory.
'SlEy, wimrm, v. Detroit United Railway et aL, Z7 D. L. N. 636.
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that death has prevented a right of acti6n from vesting. Such
would not be the case where a person, lived after the injury; and it
would be the case where the death was instantaneous * * *"
We have seen in the Olivier case that authorities were cited, ap-
parently with approval, holding that "survival of the injury for a
moment is sufficient to permit the cause of action to vest and sur-
vive." We have als seen that conscious suffering has been men-
tioned in this connection, yet it is said in the Olivier case that "there
is no occasion for saying that one dies instantly because such .sur-
vival is accompanied by a comatose condition, or unconsciousness,
or insanity, or idiocy. The law draws no such distinctions between
the normal and the abnormal, or the rational and irrational. Either
has a right of action * * *"
The rule stated in the Dolson, Sweetland and Olivier cases would
seem to possess the .requisite legal certainty and definiteness. It is
this: If death 'results instantly, then no cause of action vests and
consequently none survives; if death does not result instantly, a
cause of actiork vests and one survives; consciousness or uncon-
sciousness has no effect whatever upon the vesting of the cause of
action in the injured party and consequently no .effect upoa its sur-
vival.
Applying this rule to the facts in the West case, it would seem
that plaintiff should have based his action upon the Survival Act.
The deceased "was heard to groan for about fifteen minutes after
the accident," yet the court held that "a continuing injury resulting
in death within a few moments is instantaneous within the meaning
of the Death Act;" and in answer to the contention of counsel for
the defendant, based upon the Olivier case, "that as, under the un-
disputed testimony, the plaintiff's deceased continued to live for some
fifteen minutes.after he was struck, though he was dead when taken
from beneath the car, the appropriate remedy is under the Sur-
vival Act," the court said: "We are of opinion that this case is
distinct authority for the opposite view. Where there is a contin-
uing injury, resulting in death within a few moments, it is 'instanu
taneous' within the meaning of the statute."
The following questions suggest themselves: Did not a cause.
of action vest in the injured party during the fifteen minutes that
he lived after he was struck? If it vested, would it not survive?
If it survived, should not the action have been based upon the Sur-
vival Act? If no cause vested during the fifteen minutes, how much
time must have elapsed in order that one would have vested? Does
not the rule that we have seen was previously stated, as well as the
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reason upon which that rule was based, furnish a ready answer f6
each of these questions?
Starting again'with the rule in the Wcst case, namely, "where
there is a cbntinuing injury resulting in death within a few mo-
ments, it is instantaneous within the meaning of the statute," let
us apply it to the facts in the Ely case. Here, as we have seen, the
injured party survived the original injury from ten minutes to a
half hour. The theory, therefore, that, in this case, an action could
be sustained under the Suirvival Act, assumes that a cause of Action
could-vest'in the injured party in ten minutes; a shorter time than
the injured, party lived in the WVcst case. It Nould seem that if in
the-one case the Survival Act applied, it would do so in the other.
The court, however, distinguished them as follows: In the Vest
case the direct cause of death continued to, operate directly upon
the injured person until life Was extinct; in the Ely case the direct-
cause of death did not operate continuously but ceased with the
first blow. The facts were that in the Ely, case, the deceased met -
his death as a result of being struck on the head by the trolley-wheel
and pole- of an interurban car, and in the Wcst case, the deceased
was, struck by and carried under a rapidly moving street car and
crushed so that when taken out life was extinct. In endeavoring
'to- appreciate the distinction made by the court in these two cases,
the following questions naturally- pr.esent themselves: Assuming
that the direct cause of death continued to operate directly upon the
injured person,-until life was extinct, would, this. make any differ-
ence, assuming also that the first 'negligent blow was fatal? Are
not both of these contingencies entirely probable? Should the fact
that the defendant continued to repeat his negligent act until life
was extinct, make any difference? Might there not well be a series
of negligent act-s or blows, any one of which would be fatal? Why
should importance be attached to the fact that life was extinct when
the injured party was taken from under the car? Suppose the
party when first strick by the car, is thrown to one side of the street,
and' ekpires there, would this make a difference?
When it is remembered that the damages recoverable under the
Survival Act differ substantially from those recoverable under the
Death, Act, it would seem that-a "mor- rational and practical basis
should be found for the application of these'acts respectively.
As to the measure of damages, one rule applies under the Sur-
vival Act and another rule under the Death. Act. The Survival
Act "is silent upon the question of damages and refers to classes of
action which have long existed independent of statutes. The com-
mon law, not statute,'fixed the measure of damages in these actions
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before Michigan was, a state, or the United States .a government,
and it was not changed. '9 The court below, in the Kyes. case
t ° in-
structed the jury as follows:
"The plaintiff is entitled to recover the same damages that
the deceased w'ould have been entitled to recover had he
brought the action in his lifetime. That is to say, you may
award such damages as in your judgment would be a fair
compensation for the loss sustained by the deceased by reason
" of the injuries he. received. You are to consider his age, his
habits of industry, his'ability to labor, his caPacity' to earn
money, and the wages he was in the habit of earning when in-
jured, and the length of" time he would probably'have lived had
he not been injured, the loss he sustained by reason of being
deprived by such injuries of the ability to labor and earn
money during the time he probably would have lived had he
not been injured,-using your best judgment, under all the
fa~ts and circumstances in the case, in arriving at what would
be a just compensation for such loss."
The Supreme Court held that the instruction 'of'the court below
was correct and pointed out thai in the Dolson case it was said
"that the administrator could recover 'the- full measure of damages
for the benefit of next, of kin'," and further said, "when an action
survives, the representatives of the deceased are entitled to recover
the same measure of damages that he could have recovered "if he
had lived to bring his, suit to a successful issue."
In the Olivier case!- the court below "'was of the opinion thit the
damages must be limited to the amount that deceased could have
earned during the few hours that he lived after' receiving the inju-
ry." Under this view the plaintiff recovered a judgment for four
dollars. In reversing the case the Supreme Court said:
"Counsel for the defendant urge that the damages recover-
able in such a case should be only (I) the injury to .feelings,
pain and anguish of deceased while he actually lived, and (2)
the loss of earnings. during the remainder of the time
that he actually lived. This is an unreasonable limitation.
We need not discuss the reasoning by which the result is
reached. We have long ago held that prospective damages
a. recoverable. An injured person may recover for loss of
-Norblad v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., z56 Mich. 697; Ingersoll v. Detroit & U. Ry.
Co., 128 N. W. 227 (Decided Nov.. ii, 1go).1OKyes v. Valley Telephone Co., 132 Mich. 281.
Olivier v. Houghton County St.-Ry. Co., 134 Mich- 367.
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"earnings for the period 'during which- the evidence fairly
shows that he would have lived but for the injury. This rule
would apply tq one who should live long enough to try his'
case, though he should die the following day. But defend-
ant's contention would subltitute another rule upon a second
trial after his death, should such, trial become necessary
Such recovery is based, upon the actual damages suffered
through the accident. bn the first trial the recovery-is based
upon a probable prospective incapacity for a probable period.
After death, such incapacity (and consequent loss) is made
certain, where'if 'was only probable before. The period alone
remains uncertain. As to pain and mental suffering, -it is
different. Upon the first trial, the duration of such pain and
suffering is uncertain; upon the second, it is definite. As' has
been already suggested, it is not a new doctrine that pros-
pective damages, when reasonably certain, may be recovered.
It is a part of the right that survives under the act, as was held
in the Kyes case. Such a construction removes the only ob-
jection that can be'.urged against the view Which we have.
taken of the Death Act. It gives to the representative the
absolute right to the, remedy which his ancestor had, instead'
of leaving it to depend upon the accident of his dependency."
When this case came on for trial again in the court below, -that
_,6ourt refused to instruct the jury that it should deduct what it
"would probably cost decedent for his food, clothing, and other per-
sona expenditures." The plaintiff recovered a verdict for $7,30o.
The case was again taken to the Supreme Court,12 and the principal
question raised was that the court committed error in this refusal'
In affirming the judgment it was said:
"in my opinion, the trial judge correctly interpreted and
applied the- decision of this court given on the former hear-
ing of this case. 134 Mich. 367. In that case it was held
that the plaintiff might'recover for the loss of earnings which
the evidence fairly shows that deceased would have made dur-
ing the period which he would have lived, but for the injury.
This rule is to my mind the only just one to apply. The
-present plaintiff sues in a representative capacity. He ought
to be. able to demand the same damages that the deceased
might have exacted if the action had been brought to trial
during the latter's lifetime. If this be not so, then the stat-
ute is in part inoperative; and-the action does not survive to
1 Olivier v. Houghton County St.-Ry. Co., 138 Mich. 242.
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the legal representative, except in a limited degree But we
held in Kyes v. Telephone CO., J32, Mich. 281, and iuf Olivier
v. Railway Co., 134 Mich. 367, that the administrator is en-
titled to the same damages that deceased could have recov-
•ered, had he lived to' bring the suit to a successful issue. * * *"
"Still more inequitable is *the suggestion that thi plaintiff's
damages ought to be reduced because, the defendant, by the
severity of, the injuries inflicted, succeeded in relieving the
'deceased of the burden of supporting himself after a short
period, as the injury shortened his life. In the first place,
such a contention erroneously presupposes that the tort feasor
is concerned in the manner 'in which his victim' shall dispose
of the: damages whiich he receives for his injuries. With an
respect for the contention,, it may be stated that it is none of
the defendant's business how the'injured party 'disposes of the
money received in compensation f6o the injury. The fallacy
is 'in assuming, as a premise (although not so stated) that the
action.is, in some sense, to recover for the cost of the injured
party's maintenance. This is in no sense true. The action
is to recover the damages -which have resulted as a present
loss to the'injured party, in being deprived of a capacity' to
earn money, which capacity he had before the injury, and
which he now has not.. That capacity he had, with an assur-
ance of a contihuance for his expectancy of life (subjec,
of course, to ordinary vicissitudes as to sickness). He has
it not now for any period. If we subtract'nothing from such
expectancy, we have as a result the period of earning capac-
ity of which the injured party is deprived ** *"
'In the Miller cases the court below in its instrction- to the jury
followed the Kyes case and the Olivier case'respeting the probable
earnings of the deceased during the time that he probably would
have lived and added to this the pain and suffering endured up to
the time of death, but failed to limit the earnings to the present
worth of the wages. This was affirmed in the Supreme Court, ex-
cept that it was 'held that the jury should be instructed to*allow
only the present worth of ihe wages. .-
In the Davis case1' -the court'below instructed the jury as follows:
"If you find for the plaintiff, you will render a verdict for
all damages sustained in consequence of the injury to and
death of- the young man. These will comprise a reasonable
33 Miller v. Sadowsky, 138 Mich. o2.
-4 Davis v. Mich. Central R. CO., 147' Mich. 4;79.
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. amount for any pain and suffering he endured from the time
of the injury to his death, and, in addition, a reasonable
amount for all sums that he would probably have earned
during the years that he would probably have lived, .but for
the. injury. Your verdict will be the sum of these two. You
are not concerned with the amount of earnings that the young
- man would. probably have. saved during his probable life,
but only with the probable earnings themselves. The table
'of expectancy put in evidence shows that, if -of good health,
he might have lived 40years longer than he did. E.timati
the present worth of his probable earnings, during the time
- - that he would -probably have lived at 5 per cent. simple in-
- terest for each year, and the sum of these for. several years
- that he would probably have lived will be the 'amount of your
verdict for loss of earnings."
'The Supreme Court said that the' measure of damages given in
tfiis instruction was correct, and it is stated in'the syllabug that the
dam ages recoverable under the Survival Act "include the present
worth of the intestate's earnings during his probable lifetime, had'
he not been injured, 'undiminished by the expens'e of his living*
during that time."
-The following propositions would seen to be settled by these
cases respecting the measure of :damages under the Survival Act:
That this act did not change the common law rule; that this rule
s'i that the personal representative is entitled to recover the same
amount of damages that- the injured 'party could have recovered
had he'lived to prosecute the suit himself; that in estimating the
damages under this act' it is proper for the jury to consider the
earning ability of the party injured, the length of time he -probably
would have lived had. he not been injured, and the loss- he sustained
,by reason of being deprived, by such injuries, of the ability to labor
and earn money during this time, -the sufferings, pain -and anguish
during the time that he actually lived after the injury; that no de-
duction should be made from the earnings on account of what it
would, have cost -deceased for food, clothing, or other personal -ex-
penditures during the time he would have lived but for the injury;
and that in estimating the earnings it is the present. worth that
should be allowed and not the sum total of the wages that deceased
-might have earned.
The rule respecting the measure of damages under the Death
' t, is wholly different from that obtaining under the Survival
Act. The statute itself provides that "the jury may give such dam-
ages as they shall deem fair and just with reference to the pecuniary
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injury resulting from such death." It is firmly established by the
decisions that in an action brought under this act "the damages to
be awarded must be limited.to the pecuniaryloss sustained by those
in whose interest the case is prosecuted."15
In the Cooper case, supra, in referring to the provisions of the-
Death Act, the Supreme Court said:
"The statute authorizes the jury, in every case of this kind,
to give such amount of damages as they shall deem fair and
just to the persons who may be entitled to the same when
recovered. Under this statute the jury are not warranted in
giving damages not founded upon the testimony, or beyond
the measure of compensation' for the injury inflicted. They
cannot give damages founded upon their fancy, or based upon
visionary estimates of probabilities or chances. The rule of
damages in actions for torts do not apply to actions of this
kind. The statute gives the right to damages; but it has
been held, with rare exceptions, that they must be confined
to those damages which are capable of being measured by a
pecuniary standard."
The statement quoted above has been repeated with approval in
the subsequent cases of Balch v. *G. R. & I. R. R. Co., Hurst v. Det.
City Ry:, and Snyder v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., supra.
The case of Van Brunt v. Railroad Co., supra, was one brought
by an administrator against the railroad company under the rail-
road law providing that the jury should give such damages as are
fair and just, which should be distributed to- the persons entitled
.under the statute of distribution. . The court held that under "thiq
law the measure of damages was the same as under the Death Act.
In this case the proof showed that the deceased was a young man,
unmarried, and about twenty-two years of age at the time of his
death. There was no evidence that anyone was dependent upon him
for support, but it was assumed by the court for the purposes of the
case that he had a father and a brother living. The Supreme Court
sustained the c6urt. bekw in taking the case from the jury on the
ground that the proof showed no person was pecuniarily injured by
the death of the-plaintiff's intestate. In the Hurst case, supra, it i'
said that the Death Act "provides that when a person is killed by
" Gorton v. Harmon, IS7 Mich. 473; Snyder v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 131 Mich.
4.8; Fluhrer v, Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., xzz Mich. 212; Walker v. Lake Shore, etc.,
xxx Mich. Sx8; Nelson v. Railway Co., 104 Mich. s82; Charlebois v. Railroad Co., 9!
Mich. S9; Hurst v. Detroit City Ry., 84 Mich. 539; Balch v. G. R. & I. R. R. Co.,
67 Mich. 397; Van Brunt v. Railroad Co, 78 Mich. 330; Cooper v. L. S. & 2 . S. Ry.
Co., 66 Mich. 261; Mynning v. Det., Lans. & North. R. R. Co., S4 Mich. 257; Chic.
& N. W. Ry. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 204; Ingersoll v. Detroit & M. Ry. Co., x28 N.
W. 227 (Decided Nov. ix, 1go).
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negligence, and pecuniary injury results, the right of action for such
injury survives to the personal representatives. It dearly conten-
plates that pecuniary injury must result from the negligent act; and.
therefore, to entitle the party to recover in such action, the negli-
gence must not only be established, but also. some pecuniary injury
or loss must be shown by evidence. Such damages for the loss of
prospective earnings are special in their character, and must be spec-
ially pleaded, and a recovery can only be had based upon evidence
establishing the fAct."
In the case of a son or daughter or wife, it is held that the cost
of maintenance must be deducted from the value of the services,
and the pecuniary loss in each case is the value of the services less
the cost of maintenance, 8 and that a pecuniary injury resulting
from the death of a person can only be measured by the standard of
the pecuniary value of the life of such person, and its loss to the
person entitled to such damages when recovered. 7 The following
have been excluded as elements of damages: Loss of occasional
assistance in studies rendered by a father to his children ;18 com-
pensation for grief, loss of companionship, wounded feelings, or
suffering, either of the deceased or of the beneficiary ;.19 injuries that
are not susceptible of compensation by a money consideration-;0
danages founded upon the fancy of the jury, or based upon vis-
ionary estimate of probabilities or chances ;21 the poverty of those
in whose interest the action is prosecuted and the wealth of the de-
fendant ;22 the profits resulting from a son's labor and which could
have been procured by employing a substitute for the deceased ;23
mental suffering and injured feelings, or any other injuries not sus-
ceptible of compensation by a money consideration to those who are
entitled, and all other elements not based upon well-defined facts
or known circumstances susceptible of some proof under the well-
settled rules of evidence ;' 4 and in the case of a minor child, all pros-
16Moers v. Det. United R'y Co., zS8 Mich. 659; Gorton v. Harmon, 152 Mich. 473;
Snyder v. Railway Co., 131 Mich. 4z8; McDonald v. Steel Co., z40 Mich. 4o.
1 Rajnowski v. Railroad Co., 74 Mich. 2o.
"Walker v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co., xxx Mich. 5r8.
"Nelson v. Railroad Co., z04 Mich. 582.
SVan Brunt v. Railroad Co., 78 Mich. 530.
=Balch v. G. R. & I. R. R. Co., 67 Mich. 394; Cooper v. L.'S. & M. S. R'y
Co., 66 Mich. 26s; McDonald v. Champion Iron and Steel Co., 140 Mich. 401; Moers
v. Michigan United Railway Co., z58 Mich. 659; Snyder v. L. Shore, etc., R. R. Co.,
131 Mich. 418.
22Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Iayfield, 37 Mich. 204.
Moers v. Det. United R'y Co., £38 Mich. 659.
14Gorton v. Harmon, xz Mich. 473; Kalis v. Det. United Ry, s5s Mich. 485;
McDonald v. Champion Iron & Steel Works, 140 Mich. 40!; Hurst v. DeL R'y Co.,
84 Mich. 539; Mynning v. Det., Lansing & Nor. R. R. Co., 59 Mich. 257; Chicago &
N. W. R. R. Co. v. ]Bayfield, 37 Mich. 2o5.
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pective earnings extending beyond the expectancy of the lives of
the parents and the survivor'of them. 23 No exemplary damages are
allowed 8 and no damage can be recovered for pain or suffering;
mental or physical.2T
It has been held in two recent cases 28 that a count under the Sur-
vival Act may be .joined with a count under the Deata Act. In
the Carbary case, a declaration containing a count under each act
was demurred to, and it was contended -that the. counts on their
face were inconsistent, as one alleged that. the plaintiff's intestate
lived ten minutes after the accident, while the other was based on
instantaneous death. 'It was also claimed that 'the two rights of
action did not accrue to the plaintiff in the same right, as the dam-
ages recovered under the Survival Act would' belong to the estate
of the deceased, while under the Death Act the damages recovered
would be distributed to the next of kin shown to have been injured,
and it was also urged that the measure of damages was not the same
in both cases. The action of the lower court in overruling the de-
murrer was sustained, the Supreme Court saying in substance that
the right of action under each act was an asset of the estate; that
'under either the'plaintiff would be the personal representative; that
neither a difference in distributive right nor in the measure of dam-
ages was an obstacle to the joinder; that cases might arise where
the right of recovery was certain but the remedy uncertain, and de-
pendent upon what might be disclosed at the trial, and what a jury
might conclude, respecting the conjunction in point of time of acci-
dent and death, and that such a case would almost require a joinder
to prevent delay, expense, and the danger of .'falling between two
stools" as the result of successive verdicts; that plaintiff had no
choice; that a recovery could not be had on both counts, and de-
fendant was entitled to the concurrerce of the jurors on one or the
other; that -the right of joinder was within the rule laid down in
other Michigan cases; that the wisdom of permitting a joinder to
meet the exigencies of varying testimony had often been vindicated;
that neither the difference in the distribution of the damages nor in
the measure of damages should preclude the joinder; and it was
admitted that there ;was not a double remedy, that the existence of
the cause of action set up in one count Was entirely inconsistent with
the existence of that set up in the other, and that the right of joinder
was denied by the courts of some jurisdictions.
2 Hurst v. Det. City R'y Co., 84 Mich. 539.
2 Rajnowski v. R. R. Co., 74 Mich. 20.
2- McDonald v. Champion Iron & Steel Co., 140 Mich. 401.
2 Carbary v. Det. United R'y, 157 Mich. 683; Pritchett v. Det., Jackson & Chicago
R'y Co., 157 Mich. 687.
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After some hesitation on the part of the court, it may be regarded
as settled that a declaration counting upon one of these acts cannot-
.be changed by amendment so as to count upon the other act. 8
Among the reasons given for denying the .right of amendment are
the following: That it would introduce a new and different cause
of action; that the measure of damages is different; that satisfaction
of a claim under one of these acts would be no bar-to a claim tnder
the other; that the claim under one of the acts was given by statute,
while under the other it was given by the common "law; 'and that
the proof of a cause of action under one- act would not sustain a
cause of action under the other.-
T. A. BOGLE.
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